[Map of Nothern Italy, Agnadello]

On May 14, 1509, Alviano's force encountered and was set upon by French forces at Agnadello, southwest of Bergamo. Alviano's troops held a strong position and successfully repulsed attacks first by cavalry and then by pikemen. Alviano called upon Pitigliano, whose army was only a few miles away, to bring his forces up in support, but Pitigliano - a more cautious commander - apparently decided it was better to preserve his troops and he made no response. Perhaps a different reaction from Pitigliano would have changed the course of events.

In fact, however, the French king arrived with his own reinforcements instead, throwing Alviano's army into confusion, collapse and - where possible - flight. Venetian soldiers who were not killed or captured disappeared into the countryside. Nor had Pitigliano, by staying out of the battle, preserved his army. Instead, he found large segments of his own mercenary forces bolting en masse.

Suddenly, with the collapse of the Venetian army the pathway to the shores of the Venetian lagoon seemed to open wide to the forces of the League. Soon Venice saw her mainland cities falling to the enemy almost without resistance.

Due to the unprecedented disaster of Agnadello Venice lost within a month almost all the mainland empire it had acquired since the early Quattrocento. What made this war different for Venice, however, was not merely the scale of the defeat but the length and intensity of the conflict that followed, lasting eight years and placing enormous strains on Venetian resources and, eventually, on the Republic’s political system itself.

[Giovanni Bellini, The Doge Leonardo Loredan (1501-1504)]

«The whole city was in a state of gloom, and there was much railing against fortune for allowing such a fine army to be wretchedly beaten. They blamed the greed of Alviano, and they wanted him here to give some satisfaction to the people, and they blamed even more the Capitanio, who is worthless, and the condottieri and our own troops, who are worth zero; everyone concludes that we have lost this most excellent state. And they greatly blamed the members of the Collegio, who will be noted down remembered for ever: we are done for, and they did not know what to do, nor have they taken any measures at all. (...)
One sees that God has abandoned us for our sins. It was Ascension Day, but everyone has been weeping, almost no foreigners have come, nobody has been seen in the Piazza, the father figures of the Collegio are at a complete loss, and even more so our Doge, who said nothing and was like a dead man and [thoroughly] wretched.
And the final proposal, discussed by everyone, was to send the Doge in person as far as Verona, to put some heart into our troops and the people, and to make the Councillors go with him; if he should make this move, 500 nobles would go with His Serenity, at their own expense. It was talked about both on the Piazza and on the benches of the Senate. And the members of the Collegio did not want to put to his son, and they said, The Doge will do as the city requires; however, he is more dead than alive; he is [...] years old.‘ I conclude, these are bad times: we see our ruin ahead, and nobody does anything.»

I diarii di Marino Sanudo, ed. R. Fulin et al., 58 vols, Venice 1879-1903; here: viii, cols 265-6; tranlated by Chambers; Pullan (1992), p. 75.


3. Structure: Investment in public loan funds and in land (1509)

Venetian public finance, especially in wartime, depended on raising large sums through forced loans rather than outright taxation. A sizable porportion of the state’s income was assigned to servicing the public debt, which was secured upon certain earmarked taxes. In 1262 outstanding loans to the state had been consolidated into the loan fund which became known as the Monte Vecchio, paying interest at 5 per cent of the face value of the holdings. At the time of the War of Ferrara (1482-1483) the second public loan fund - the Monte Nuovo - was created. By 1509 it had expanded far beyond its original limit of 550'000 ducats, and as much as 3 million were now invested in it. Taken from Girolamo Priuli’s lively account of the crisis of Agnadello, the following text shows how holdings in the Monti had become for many Venetians a supposedly safe and trouble-free security preferable to landed estates. Himself smarting from the experience, Priuli tells how the value of state could plummet when war broke out and the state lost its capacity to pay interest.

«By the collapse of the Venetian state, [holdings] in the loan funds of the Monte Vecchio and Monte Nuovo were depressed to a very low level, and there were no buyers and no money [for the bonds], for in the face of these catastrophes all were thinking of their own interests and wanting to preserve their money, so that in case of disaster they could save themselves and escape from all danger, holding on to the money, for otherwise they would be ruined and undone. This loan fund of the Monte Nuovo used to enjoy the highest reputation in the city of Venice, because the holdings were valued at 102½ per cent before the present war, and I, the present writer, bought myself some 4000 ducats‘ worth, as can be seen from our account books. (...) To tell the truth, as I am bound to do, no one would ever have imagined that the Venetian mainland state could be lost and destroyed within fifteen days, as we have now seen. The holdings of the Monte Nuovo were now worth 40 per cent at most, and I myself, as stated above, had spent that great sum of money on buying them at 102½ per cent, and have received but one interest payment, so you can imagine how terrible is my loss. (...)
There was already a saying that when the Venetian army was broken so too were the laws and decrees, and everything possible had to be done to maintain this city and Republic and to keep alive this most sickly, indeed moribund, body, because, if the city of Venice fell, the interest from loan funds and indeed all things would fail with it. But, if the city were preserved, they would in time be paid. So nothing should be heeded but the preservation of the Republic and city of Venice, and all else should be put aside, and all due and necessary measures be taken as the times and events required.
How many citizens and nobles and people there were who could have put their money into land and other goods, but did not want to do so, to spare themselves the trouble of going to the mainland! Many, too, wanted to avoid the expense of horses and carriages, for the mainland calls for luxuries, such as estates and great houses, with other expenditure, and much of the income is consumed in such pleasures. Some, again, were anxious not to turn their sons into country bumpkins, for ever attending to their estates, and to give them no such pretext they were reluctant to buy land and wanted their heirs to apply themselves to commerce and become merchants instead, following the most ancient custom of the city of Venice, and so have no reason to go in pursuit of pleasures, which cannot be done without incurring enormous and unceasing expenditure. By the same token they preferred to invest their money in the Monte Nuovo rather than in estates. So, when they witnessed the ruin of the Venetian state and the closure of the Monte Nuovo, they were very ill content and wished that they had bought landed estates - for although, as they perceived, these were now lost and had fallen into enemy hands, they still hoped for their recovery in future. Moreover, these properties had a firm foundation, which the enemy could not remove, and if their revenues could not be collected in one year they could be gathered in another, for things could not go on as they now were, and in time they would be turned to good account. But these Monti Vecchi and Monti Nuovi were just castles in the air; they were nothing but books, made of paper and ink. Many who had loudly praised the Camera degli Imprestiti were left in no doubt that they had been deceived, knowing that land and property were better [than government bonds]. The Monte Nuovo owed some 3 million ducats, a vast sum of money, and the interest due upon this was 150'000 ducats, in two payments each year of approximately 75'000 ducats at six-monthly intervals. And in the truth all this money had been spent on the wars of Lombardy and the defence of the mainland, but now all was seen to be lost, and the debt had been passed on to the poor nobles and citizens of Venice.»

Priuli, Girolamo, I Diarii, ed. A. Segre 1912 (I) and R. Cessi 1913 (II), 1938 (IV), RIS XXIV.3, Città di Castello (I) and Bologna (II, IV), here: IV, p. 15-17; translated by Chambers; Pullan (1992), p. 160-162.

4. Representation: Jacopo Palma’s «Allegory of the War of the League of Cambrai» (around 1582)

[Jacopo Palma’s Allegory]

5. Relation: Selling the Republic and its virtues

After the War of the League of Cambrai there was a tremendous demand for offices, partly because the conflict itself eliminated or diminished alternative sources of income. At same time Venice was in great need of money in order to keep on financing the war. In this atmosphere of crisis, the government was driven to the desperate and humiliating expedient of raising money by auctioning its own offices for low-interest loans. The state became an object of commerce. Such a measure was fundamentally repugnant to Venetian political values, which regarded government office as a sacred and selfless responsibility, distant from family loyalties, personal ambition, and financial gain. Loans for office threw the Great Council into disarray. Age, reputation, and service to the state meant nothing in the elections. Only those who gave loans obtained office. In the following text the Venetian diarist Marcantonio Michiel describes the scene of bedlam in the chamber of the Great Council on the 24th August 1515, the very day on which the sum of 47'000 ducats was dispatched to Bartolomeo d'Alviano before the decisive battle of Marignano.

«By the end of the day 47'000 ducats had been raised, though with the greatest shame and disrepute for the Great Council. When the nominators were sequestered, those who knew of thought that they would be chosen by them immediately ran to the tribuna fo the Signoria to offer money; and when their competitors outbid them, they would turn back to add on more by yelling, as is done at auctions. Those in the Great Council crowded in front of the hall to see and hear better, so that there wasn’t a bit of order. Also, those on the bench of the Signoria received information from the nominators, and learning of some rich man who would be nominated, they sent for him to come to the Great Council in order to have him make an offer and be elected.»

Michiel, Marcantonio, Diarii, MCC. MS. Cod. Cicogna, 2848, fol. 189r. (translated by Finlay (1980), p. 179)

6. Short bibliography

Chambers, David; Pullan, Brian (ed.), Venice: a documentary history, 1450-1630, Oxford / Cambrigde 1992.

Priuli, Girolamo, I Diarii, ed. A. Segre 1912 (I) and R. Cessi 1913 (II), 1938 (IV), RIS XXIV.3, Città di Castello (I) and Bologna (II, IV).

Finlay, Robert, Politics in Renaissance Venice, London 1980.

I diarii di Marino Sanudo, ed. R. Fulin et al., 58 vols, Venice 1879-1903.

1. Subject / Figure: Enrico Scrovegni

Enrico Scrovegni was one of Padua's best known and wealthiest citizens. He took over his father's lucrative business and had amassed a fortune by lending money at high rates, a practice that the church and fellow citizens saw as sinful. The family was not on the best of terms with the church. During the siege of 1320, Enrico deserted Padua and fled to Venice where he lived until he died in 1336. His body was brought back to Padua and placed in his tomb in the chapel. Enrico had built the chapel thinking it would guarantee him a place in heaven.

In his Divine Comedy Dante Alighieri banishes Reginaldo, Enrico's father, to the seventh circle of hell. This part of hell is reserved for sinful usurers who were considered the violents against nature and art. The «azure sow» (l. 65) is the device of the Scrovegni family («scrofa», in fact, means sow‘). The speaker of the ll. 66-73 is Reginaldo Scrovegni.

Canto XVII

43. So off I went unto utmost east
44. of Circle Seven, there to analyse
45. the patiens sitting on their burning seats.

46. Stark misery was pouring from their eyes;
47. on this side, then on that, they’d brush away
48. the falling flames, or scorching cinders. Likewise

49. dogs, throughout a roasting summer’s day,
50. will agitate with snout and paw, as gnat
51. and gadfly torture them, as is their way.

52. When I’d examined several where they sat
53. beneath the constant rain of molten slag,
54. I didn’t know a single face, but saw that

55. from the neck of each there hung a bag,
56. of such-and-such a colour and design,
57. on which they fed their eyes, like hungry lags.

58. And as I walked inspecting down the line,
59. I saw one with a yellow leather purse
60. emblazoned with a rampant azure lion.

61. Then, my look continuing its course,
62. I saw another with a pouch of scarlet
63. on which was displayed a milk-white goose.

64. And one who had a little argent wallet
65. featuring a pregnant azure sow
66. cried out: ‚What business have you in this pit?

67. Be off! but wait, as you’re alive, I vow
68. my neighbour Vitaliano once again
69. will sit with me. If not, there’ll be a row.

70. Among these Florentines am I, a Paduan;
71. day in, day out, they din it in my ears,
72. crying: «Just you wait until the sovereign

73. with there goats on his money-bag appears!»‘
74. With that, he made a mouth, and stuck out his tongue
75. like an ox that licks its nose. And I, in fear

76. my social visit might seem over-long
77. to him who’d warned me not so speechify
78. too much with them, forsook that dreary throng.

Dante Alighieri, The Inferno, a new translation by Ciaran Carson, London / New York 2002, p. 114-115.

2. Event: Building the Arena Chapel

The Arena Chapel was built between 1303 - 1305 by Enrico Scrovegni in memory of his father Reginaldo, a well-known money-lender. Giotto was commissioned to decorate the interior with frescoes. The cycle follows three main themes: episodes from the life of Joachim and Ann, episodes from the life of Mary and episodes from the life and passion of Jesus. The lower part of the chapel is decorated by a series of paintings, which represent the allegories of the Vices and the Virtues.

The frescoes in the Arena Chapel in Padua are among the most celebrated works in the history of art. Giotto's work was a source of inspiration and instruction for generations of painters; it was studied and absorbed by Masaccio, Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, and Raphael, artists whose own work was to be of such fundamental importance for the history of European art.

Documents on the Arena Chapel are few in numbers. Nevertheless we can outline the main phases of its building history.

3. Structure: Caritas‘ versus Indivia‘

Giotto painted fourteen personifications of the Virtues and Vices in marble under the frescoes on the side walls. The Virtues are on the right wall which is on the side of heaven. The Vices are on the left wall which is on the side of hell. The message is clear: Virtue leads to heaven and Vice to hell.

[The allegories of «Caritas» and «Invidia»]

4. Representation: Enrico - the proud commissioner

[Enrico Scrovegni]

Spazzi, Anna Maria, La Cappella degli Scrovegni a Padova, Milan 1993.